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CHAPTER 12 
Ethics 
BARRY BROWN* 
§ 12.1. Introduction. Although considerable attention in 1982 was given 
by the bar to the debate over the Proposed Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct! as promulgated by the Kutak Committee of the American Bar 
Association, the Supreme Judicial Court considered and decided several 
cases of importance involving issues of professional conduct under the 
presently adopted Code of Professional Responsibility in Massachusetts. 2 
Specifically, the Court considered problems arising in the areas of conflict 
of interest,3 prosecutorial misconduct in the course of final argument 
before a jury4 and reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer.5 Although the 
cases noted and described in this chapter are not exhaustive of all of the 
decisions of the Court or the Board of Bar Overseers in 1982, they 
nevertheless represent significant opinions in areas of broad concern 
regarding attorney conduct and discipline. 
§ 12.2. Reinstatement. As recently as ten years ago, it was possible to 
conclude after a review of the case law in Massachusetts that the deci-
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court fell squarely within the majority of 
jurisdictions which rarely permitted the reinstatement of disbarred attor-
neys.! Although there had been some inconsistency, particularly in this 
century, in the manner in which the courts of the Commonwealth dealt 
with the discipline of attorneys, instances of reinstatement appear to have 
largely resulted from the bifurcation of jurisdictional authority between 
* BARRY BROWN is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. The author 
wishes to thank Barbara Neumann, J.D., Suffolk University Law School 1983, for her 
invaluable assistance with respect to the research necessary for this article. 
§ 12.1. I MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981). 
2 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07, 3:08, 4:01 et seq. 
3 McCourt Company, Inc. v. FPC Properties, Inc., 386 Mass. 145, 434 N.E.2d 1234 
(1982). 
4 Commonwealth v. Hoppin, 387 Mass. 25, 438 N.E.2d 820 (1982). 
5 Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 429 N.E.2d 1150 (1982). 
§ 12.2. I See Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 50 N .E.2d 745 (1943), and related cases, 
313 Mass. 186,47 N.E.2d 12 (1943),310 Mass. 166,37 N.E.2d 516 (1942),287 Mass. 577, 192 
N.E. 65 (1934); Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass. 348, 137 N.E. 667 (1923); Boston Bar 
Association v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 46 N.E. 568 (1897). 
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the trial courts and the Supreme Judicial Court.2 Until the 1975 decision in 
the Matter of Alger Hiss,3 it was fair to say that the Supreme Judicial 
Court adhered to the strict view of the American Bar Association as 
expressed by the long-time Chairman of its Ethics Committee, Henry 
Drinker: 
While it is ... always possible that a disbarred lawyer may be reinstated, 
this, it is believed, should almost never occur except where the court 
concludes that the disbarment was erroneous. For a lawyer who has been 
found guilty of an act warranting disbarment to be reinstated justly creates 
an impression on the public which is very bad for the reputation of the Bar, 
the conclusion being that this is because of friendship, pity or political 
influence; which is not infrequently the case.4 
Although Massachusetts, unlike some other jurisdictions, has never 
imposed an absolute bar against the reinstatement of convicted felons,S 
the Supreme Judicial Court has rarely in recent history readmitted an 
individual, particularly where disbarment has occurred as a result of the 
commission of a serious crime.6 In fact, prior to the readmission of Alger 
Hiss by the Court in 1975, two decisions of the Court, Matter of Keenan' 
and Matter of Centracchio,8 appeared to impose an almost impossible 
burden upon an applicant for readmission to the Massachusetts Bar. 
During the Survey year in Matter of Gordon 9 the Supreme Judicial Court 
once again considered a petition for reinstatement from an individual who 
had been disbarred after being convicted of a crime. The Court in Gordon 
concluded that it could not grant reinstatement. It is both useful and 
necessary to examine the Keenan and Centracchio decisions as well as 
the Court's opinion in the Hiss case in order to gain a perspective for 
analyzing the recent Gordon decision. 
In the first of these cases, Wilfred Keenan was disbarred as a result of 
2 See Matter of Keenan, 310 Mass. 166,37 N.E.2d 516 (1942). There have been instances 
of reinstatement after disbarment for serious crimes in Massachusetts but these mostly 
occurred because the disciplinary function was divided between the Supreme Judicial Court 
and the superior court. See Boston Bar Association v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169,46 N.E. 
568 (1897); Boston Bar Association v. Greenhood, No. 12421 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1902) 
(petitioner readmitted); In re Runyon, No. 89806 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1904) (attorney 
disbarred for attempted bribe of grand juror; readmitted thirteen years later); In re Casey, 
No. 311074 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1938) (attorney disbarred for bribing juror; reinstated three 
years later). 
3 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975). 
4 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1953). 
5 See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAw § 90(5) (McKinney 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-310 (1955 
and Supp. 1974). 
6 See supra note 2. 
7 314 Mass. 544, 50 N.E.2d 785 (1943). 
8 345 Mass. 342, 187 N.E.2d 383 (1963). 
9 385 Mass: 48,429 N.E.2d 1150 (1982). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/15
§ 12.2 ETHICS 389 
an investigation into public complaints of widespread corruption among 
members of the trial bar in Massachusetts. 10 The complaints turned out to 
be justified and Keenan was found to be among those who had engaged in 
the bribery of jurors. Five years after his disbarment, Keenan petitioned 
for reinstatement. More then sixty lawyers, judges and friends testified to 
his excellent moral character and to the highly ethical nature of his 
subsequent activities. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court denied 
reinstatement becaus~, in its view, Keenan had made an insufficient 
showing that he would not victimize people again in a manner that had 
resulted in his disbarment. The Court held that there was insufficient 
assurance after the passage of the five year period that if the petitioner 
were allowed to exchange the obligations and standards of the mar-
ketplace for those of the Bar he would not again fall victim to the same 
weakness that was his first undoing.!! The Court concluded that Keenan's 
conviction and subsequent disbarment were conclusive evidence of his 
lack of moral character at the time of his removal from office,12 and 
consequently "little less than absolute assurance of a complete change of 
moral character"!3 and a "guarantee against [the conduct's] repetition" 
had to be shown before a petitioner met the burden for allowing 
reinstatement.!4 
The Court in Keenan recognized that one convicted of jury tampering 
or peIjury had committed a direct attack upon the foundations of the 
judicial system and that public opinion would neither readily accept nor 
condone the return of that individual to a position of official trust. IS The 
Court rejected the notion that the question in a reinstatement case was 
whether the disbarred attorney had been punished enough. Such a test 
would emphasize the attorney's private interest over more important 
public interests. According to the Court, any balancing of values in this 
area would always have to be resolved in favor of the public welfare. 16 
10 See Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 50 N.E.2d 785 (1943), and related cases, 313 
Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12 (1943), 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1942), 287 Mass. 577, 192 
N.E. 65 (1934). 
II Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. at 550, 50 N .E.2d at 788. 
12 Matter of Keenan 313 Mass. at 219, 47 N.E.2d at 32. 
13 Matter of Keenan 314 Mass. at 549, 50 N.E.2d at 788. 
14 Id. at 551,50 N.E.2d at 789. 
IS See Matter of Bennethum, 278 A.2d 831 (Del. 1971); Wolf's Petition, 257 So.2d 547 
(Fla. 1972); Matter of Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974); Application of Sharpe, 
499 P.2d 406 (Okla. 1972); Petition of Simmons, 71 Wash. 2d 316, 428 P.2d 582 (1967). These 
cases recognize the nature and character of the charge for which the petitioner was disci-
plined as pertinent to his application for reinstatement. 
16 314 Mass. at 547, 50 N.E.2d at 787. Specifically, the Keenan Court noted: 
In deciding a case of this kind considerations of public welfare are wholly dominant. 
The question is not whether respondent has been" punished enough." To make that a 
test would be to give undue weight to his private interests, whereas the true test must 
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The Court stated the point quite concisely when, in considering the issue 
of reinstatement in the context of disbarment following the conviction of a 
crime, it said: 
A conviction of a crime, especially a serious crime, undermines public 
confidence in the [attorney]. The average citizen would find it incongruous 
for the ... [government] on one hand to adjudicate him guilty and deserving 
of punishment and then on the other hand while his conviction and liability 
to punishment still stands [for the Commonwealth] to adjudicate him inno-
cent and to retain his membership in the Bar.17 
In the Matter of Centracchio, the only other reported Massachusetts 
decision prior to Hiss dealing with the reinstatement question, the Court 
echoed the stand it had taken in Keenan and denied reinstatement. is The 
petitioner was a district attorney, who, while serving as Special Justice of 
the District Court, had been found guilty offee-splitting and attempting to 
influence witnesses. He was subsequently disbarred for this offense. 19 
The Centracchio Court jealously guarded the prerogative of the Supreme 
Judicial Court to determine the worthiness of an applicant for reinstate-
ment. The Court interpreted the Keenan decision as holding that there 
could be offenses so serious that an attorney who had committed one of 
them could never satisfy the Court that he was once again worthy of trust, 
and furthermore, could never prove that he would again inspire the 
necessary public confidence to perform the duties of an attorney. 20 
Therefore, after Keenan and Centracchio, Massachusetts appeared to fall 
squarely within that group of jurisdictions which, by the burden of proof 
imposed, made it virtually impossible for the readmission of an attorney 
previously adjudged guilty of a serious crime. Nothing short of a complete 
change of moral character and a guarantee against the repetition of future 
misconduct would apparently warrant readmission. Even with these con-
ditions satisfied, however, the possibility remained that there would be 
some offenses so heinous that they would forever bar an individual from 
once again assuming the mantel of an officer of the Court. It is from this 
point of departure that the Board of Bar Overseers considered the petition 
of Alger Hiss in 1974. Quite simply, the Hiss case appears to have 
changed a good deal of the thinking concerning reinstatement in Massa-
chusetts, and has had a substantial precedential impact upon readmission 
cases in other jurisdictions throughout the country,21 
Id. 
always be the public welfare. Where any clash of interests occurs, whatever is good 
for the individual must give way to whatever tends to the security and advancement 
of public justice. 
11 In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205,208-09,65 N.E.2d 202,204 (1946). 
18 345 Mass. 342, 187 N.E.2d 383 (1963). 
19 Id. at 346, 187 N.E.2d at 384. 
20 See id. at 346-48,187 N.E.2d at 385-86; Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. at 548-549,50 
N.E.2d at 788. 
21 See Matter of Raimondi and Dipple, 285 Md. 607, 403 A.2d 1234 (1979); Matter of 
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If any individual stood in a good position to challenge the stringent 
standards for readmission in Massachusetts, it was Alger Hiss. After 
receiving his degree from Harvard Law School in 1929, Hiss served as law 
clerk to Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court.22 In the 
years following his clerkship he was admitted to the Bars of Maryland, 
Massachusetts and New York, and he practiced in both New York and 
Boston. During the New Deal Hiss went to Washington where he served 
first as Assistant General Counsel to the Agricultural Adjustment Admin-
istration, then on the staff of the Solicitor General of the United States 
and, finally, for over a decade in the State Department. 23 After instru-
mental work in the formation of the United Nations, Hiss assumed the 
position of President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
While serving in this capacity, however, he was indicted for peIjury 
stemming from his testimony before a federal grand jury. 
The indictment charged that Hiss had committed peIjury in testifying 
that neither he nor his wife in his presence had ever turned over docu-
ments or copies of documents belonging to the United States Department 
of State or any other organization of the federal government to Whittaker 
Chambers or to any other unauthorized person. In addition, Hiss was 
charged with falsely testifying in statements before the Committee on 
Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives that he had no 
prior contact with Chambers who was an admitted member of the Com-
munist Party. On January 25, 1950, Alger Hiss was convicted on the two 
counts of peIjury and sentenced to serve three and one half years at the 
United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.24 Hiss was dis-
barred following his conviction and on August 1, 1952, he was removed 
from the office of attorney-at-law in the courts of the Commonwealth. 2s 
In considering Hiss' petition for reinstatement,26 the Board of Bar 
Overseers was bound by the standards of section 18(4) of Rule 4:01 ofthe 
Supreme Judicial Court. According to these standards, the applicant for 
readmission must demonstrate sufficient moral qualifications and compe-
tency in the law, and also establish that his readmission would not be 
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, the administration of 
Wigoda, 77 Ill. 2d 154,395 N.E.2d 571 (1979); Petition of Albert, 403 Mich. 346, 269 N.W.2d 
173 (1978); Matter of Egger, 93 Wash. 2d 706, 611 P.2d 1260 (1980). 
22 Matter of Alger Hiss, Findings and Recommendations of the Board of Bar Overseers, 
No. J-74-151, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. April 4, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Hiss, 
Findings and Recommendations]. 
23 [d. 
24 See United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 
(1951); see also United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N. Y. 1952), aiI'd per curiam, 
201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) (motion for new trial). 
25 See Matter of Alger Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 448, 333 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1975). 
26 Matter of Alger Hiss, No. J-74-151 (Mass. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 3, 1974). 
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justice, or to the public interest.27 Hiss, by his own testimony before the 
Board, pinpointed the troublesome quandary between his crime and the 
standards applicable to reinstatement by commenting: 
In my case the charge was far worse than perjury as you must be aware .... 
I had two other charges worse than perjury, which I regard as absolutely 
reprehensible in a lawyer ... failure of trust and failure of confidence, which 
is even worse for a lawyer.28 
The Board took an extremely philosophical approach to the issues 
raised by the Hiss Petition based upon the precedent established by the 
Keenan and Centracchio cases. The Board reasoned that if it had been 
asked to find evidence of present good moral character and competence 
only, it would have been able to do so unanimously. 29 A number of 
prominent attorneys, professors of law and judges, including a former 
Solicitor General of the United States and a retired Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court, testified and submitted affidavits in Mr. Hiss' 
behalf and persuaded the Board of his present good moral character and 
legal ability.30 Having determined th~se points, however, there remained 
the ever present fact that the judgm~nt of conviction on which Hiss' 
disbarment was based had never been set aside, nor had he ever been 
pardoned for the offense. This fa<;t, coupled with the holding in Massa-
chusetts that the judgment of disbarment is evidence against the person so 
removed upon his subsequent petition for readmission to the Bar, 31 
created a logical paradox which prevented the Board from recommending 
approval of the Hiss Petition to the Court. 
If the Board was required to accept the finality of the judgment and 
verdict against Hiss, as it felt it must, then it was confronted with a 
dilemma. As long as a petitioner continued to assert his innocence, he was 
questioning the appropriateness of the decision which resulted in his 
conviction and subsequent disbarment. By asserting his innocence, how-
ever, a petitioner would make it logically impossible to show that he had 
repented or reformed from earlier wrongdoing. Yet this was the position 
taken by Alger Hiss. In his testimony before the Board, Hiss made the 
dilemma clear: "I have not had any complete change of moral character. I 
am the same person I have been throughout my life."32 The very same 
assertiop of innocence was presented in the Keenan case where the Court 
found that the petitioner seemed to recognize the binding nature of the 
Court's adjudication of guilt, but that he would not also allow admission 
27 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01, § 18(4). 
28 Hiss, Findings and Recommendations, supra note 22, at 13-14. 
29 [d. at 28, 32. 
30 Compare id. at 24-27 with In re Keenan, 314 Mass. 545, 549-50, 50 N.E.2d 785, 788 
(1943). 
31 See Matter of Centracchio, 345 Mass. 342, 346, 187 N.E.2d 383, 385 (1963). 
32 Hiss, Findings and Recommendations, supra note 22, at 26. 
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of his own guilt or repentance. 33 A strictly logical approach to this point of 
view caused the Board in Hiss to conclude that such an assertion sug-
gested not only a lack of moral improvement but also the disconcerting 
notion that the petitioner "gives evidence of his present lack of moral 
character when he again testifies as to his innocence of the original charge 
in the face of a conviction, which this Board, for the purposes of its 
deliberations, must accept as establishing the fact of his guilt. "34 In a 
jurisdiction that had heretofore required evidence of nothirtg more than a 
"complete change in moral character" prior to permitting reinstatement, 
repentance and reform appeared to be essential prerequisites to 
reinstatement. 35 Even Mr. Hiss recognized the conflict raised by his 
protestations of innocence in light of the Keenan and Centracchio deci-
sions. He remarked in his testimony that "[i]f that's the law in Massa-
chusetts, I am excluded. "36 
Upon this syllogistic argument, the Board found that it would be impos-
sible to recommend the reinstatement of Mr. Hiss as long as Keenan and 
Centracchio stood as the law in Massachusetts. In fact, however, an 
examination of those two cases indicates that the Court had not applied 
the notion of repentance in the past as mechanically as the Board reported 
in its findings. Repentance was only one of several factors of relevance 
which were to be used in determining whether an applicant for reinstate-
ment had shown sufficient proof of reformation in the years subsequent to 
disbarment to overcome the presumption of bad character. Indeed, Chief 
Justice Field, who was a member of the Court in Keenan, had written 
some years before that: 
Evidence of penitence for offenses proved may have weight as tending to 
show a change of character. But I do not rule that there may not be 
circumstances in which such a change may be shown without evidence of 
penitence .... [I do not] regard admission of guilt as necessarily a condition 
of his readmission to the Bar. Clear and convincing evidence of fitness for 
readmission may exist although the petitioner protested innocence of the 
charges of which he was found guilty and the adjudication of guilt stands as 
a legal and binding adjudication .... 1 do not regard assertions of innocence 
of adjudicated guilt and consequential lack of penitence therefore as neces-
sarily fatal to readmission if the evidence of present fitness without the aid 
of penitence is clear and convincing. 37 
33 Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 550, 50 N .E.2d 785, 788 (1943). 
34 Hiss, Findings and Recommendations, supra note 22, at 19-20 (emphasis added). 
35 A number of jurisdictions continue to maintain the view that a showing of reformation 
or moral rehabilitation is essential to reinstatement. See, e.g., In re Bennethum, 278 A.2d 
831 (Del. 1971); Wolf's Petition, 257 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1972); Florida Bar v. Johnson, 241 
So.2d 161 (Fla. 1970); see also 70 A.L.R.2d 268 (1960). 
36 Hiss, Findings and Recommendations, supra note 22, at 26. 
37 In re Petition of Coakley, No. 3484, slip op. at 8-9, 51 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1934). Other 
jurisdictions faced with similar protestations of innocence on the part of a petitioner for 
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While the Board of Bar Overseers denied Hiss' readmission based upon 
the perceived failure of reformation and contrition, the Bar Counsel took 
a different approach. The Bar Counsel took the more absolutist view that 
there may be offenses so serious as to forever bar reinstatement. 38 The 
notion that there are offenses "of such heinous character that under no 
circumstances could [a petitioner] demonstrate sufficient contrition and 
atonement to justify his reinstatement as a member of the profession" 
appears to be consistent with the Keenan and Centracchio decisions. 39 
Furthermore, the American Bar Association Special Committee on Eval-
uation of Disciplinary Enforcement advocated a similar position: 
[T]he nature of the offense and the circumstances surrounding it should be 
considered in evaluating an application for reinstatement. Thus the more 
serious the offense, the nearer it strikes at the heart of the administration of 
justice, the greater the affirmative proof that should be required of the 
applicant for the admission. For example, it is difficult to conceive of 
circumstances that would justify the reinstatement of an attorney who has 
been disbarred for bribing a juror.40 
The Bar Counsel argued that because Hiss appeared before the Board and 
the Cou:t convicted of perjury, he was burdened by the failure of public 
trust and confidence and tainted by the suggestion of espionage. Cer-
tainly, it is arguable that out of all the crimes a lawyer may commit, the 
presentation of false testimony under oath is one which strikes most 
deeply at the heart of trust and confidence in the system of justice. 
Considering this point, the Bar Counsel in essence argued that there was 
"no room in the profession of law for those who commit deliberate 
falsehood in court. "41 
The Supreme Judicial Court considered both the argument made by the 
Board and that made by Bar Counsel and, surprisingly, without overturn-
ing the earlier Keenan and Centracchio decisions, appeared to arrive at a 
new standard for readmission. The Court stated that "[n]either the con-
trolling case law nor the legal standard for reinstatement to the Bar 
requires that one who petitions for reinstatement must proclaim his repen-
reinstatement have realized that "to be reinstated, one need not express 'contrition' which is 
inconsistent with a position to which he honestly and sincerely adheres." Matter of Barton, 
273 Md. 277,282,329 A.2d 102, 105 (1974); see Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 551-52, 
147 So. 791, 797 (1933); Matter of Braverman, 271 Md. 196,202-03,316 A.2d 246, 249 (1974). 
38 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 451-52, 333 N.E.2d at 433. 
39 See id. at 452,333 N.E.2d at 433. See Matter of Bennethum, 278 A.2d 831, 833 (Del. 
1971); see also Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 146 N.E. 269 (1925). 
40 ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and 
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 155 (June 1970). See People v. Buckles, 164 
Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1969); Application of Van Wyck, 225 Minn. 90, 29 N.W.2d 654 
(1947). 
41 See Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 20, 146 N.E. 269, 274 (1925). 
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tance and affirm his adjudication of guilt,"42 and thereby removed any 
doubt that might have surrounded that issue after the Keenan and Cen-
tracchio decisions. Because "mere words of repentance are easily mut-
tered and just as easily forgotten,"43 the Hiss Court reasoned that it is 
most important that the petitioner establish his ability to distinguish right 
from wrong in the conduct of men towards each other so as to indicate to 
the court that he is a fair and safe person to engage in the practice of law. 44 
A flexible approach to admission of past guilt was necessary, the Court 
argued, because although prior judgments are dispositive of all factual 
issues and prevent attorneys from re-litigating issues of guilt in rein-
statement proceedings, miscarriages of justice are possible.45 Accord-
ing to the Court, both simple fairness and fundamental justice require that 
a person who believes he is innocent though convicted should not be 
required to confess guilt through a criminal act he honestly believes he did 
not commit.46 To hold otherwise, the Court observed, would be to view 
the system of justice as incapable of error and to raise an impossible 
paradox for a petitioner: 
[H]e may startd mute and lose his opportunity; or he may cast aside his 
hard retained scruples and, paradoxically, commit what he regards as per-
jury to prove his worthiness to practice law. Men who are honest would 
prefer to relinquish the opportunity conditioned by this rule .... Honest 
men would suffer permanent disbarment under such a rule. Others, less sure 
of their moral positions, will be tempted to commit perjury by admitting to a 
non-existent offense (or to an offense that they believe is non-existent) to 
secure reinstatement.47 
Just as the Court determined that the Board's philosophical approach to 
rehabilitation did not require an admission of guilt, it also determined that 
the Bar Counsel's view that there were some crimes so serious as to 
forever bar reinstatement was not a clear standard applicable to 
reinstatement cases. The Court stated that: 
We cannot now say that any offense is so grave that a disbarred attorney is 
automatically precluded from attempting to demonstrate through ample and 
adequate proofs, drawing from conduct and social interactions, that he has 
achieved a "present fitness" ... to serve as an attorney and has led a 
sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again, in spite of 
his previous actions.4b 
42 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 455, 333 N .E.2d at 435. 
43 [d. at 457, 333 N.E.2d at 436. 
44 [d. See In re Koening, 152 Conn. 125,127,204 A.2d 33, 35 (1964); In re Stump, 272 Ky. 
59, 598-99, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1096 (1938). 
45 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 457, 333 N.E.2d at 436. 
46 [d. at 458, 333 N .E.2d at 437. 
47 /d. at 458-59, 333 N.E.2d at 437 (citations omitted). 
48 /d. at 452, 333 N.E.2d at 433 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that a holding 
that an offense resulting in disbarment was so serious as to forever deny reinstatement, 
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Having resolved that neither the refusal to admit guilt nor the nature of 
the crime committed precluded readmission, the Hiss Court was left to 
focus upon the more abstract and subjective issue of present good moral 
character. Once rehabilitation becomes a possibility in any instance, then 
the factors to be weighed in determining the worthiness of a petitioner for 
reinstatement inevitably reduce themselves to a consideration of the 
passage of time since disbarment and an examination of the experiences 
ofthe applicant during the period of banishment from the bar. In fact, the 
Hiss Court noted in its decision that a long time span between disbarment 
and a petition for reinstatement, during which the petitioner's conduct 
was exemplary, reinforces his claim of rehabilitation49 and contributes to 
a finding of present good moral character which, the Court indicated, in 
and of itself demonstrates rehabilitation. 50 
In the Hiss case, however, it is apparent that the Court meant some-
thing more concerning the petitioner when it commented that "[t]ime 
and experience may mend the flaws of character which allow the immature 
man to err. "51 The effect of the passage of time apparently weighs not 
only on the petitioner, but also on those who sit in judgment of him. 
When the Court looked back over the years to judge the event in light of 
present realities, and when it argued that justice and those responsible for 
its administration may often err, it was not looking so much at the 
repentance arid rehabilitation of the petitioner, Alger Hiss, but at the 
changing climate of political opinion which persuaded the Court to recon-
sider the propriety of the original conviction. 
Unfortunately for the Court in considering the future interpretation of 
the Hiss decision, the crime of perjury, unlike a conviction rooted in 
political subjectivity such as a violation of the Smith Act,52 is a criminal 
offense of the utmost seriousness to the legal profession, the courts and 
the public. No policy argument could be made to change this fact, even 
though there was a tremendous sense that Alger Hiss had been caught in 
the same witch-hunt that had ruined the lives of so many during the years 
immediately following World War II. Little, therefore, could be said by 
the Supreme Judicial Court about changes in prosecutorial attitudes, the 
right to dissent, or detente with communist nations, because no matter 
irrespective of good conduct or reform, might raise constitutional problems. Compare 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6(1969); Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) with Weinberger v. Salf, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
49 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 460 n.19, 333 N.E.2d at 438 n.19. 
so Id. at 461 n.22, 333 N.E.2d at 438 n.22. 
51 /d. at 454, 333 N .E.2d at 434. 
52 See Matter of Braverman, 221 Md. 196,316 A.2d 246 (1974). In Braverman the court 
was able to reinstate a disbarred attorney and at the same time confront directly the changing 
political realities which drew into question the original conviction under the Smith Act. 
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how much the Court desired to take judicial notice of the changes which 
had occurred in society generally, the underlying woblem would not wash 
away: Alger Hiss was found guilty of perhaps the most serious crime a 
lawyer could commit, peIjury. Faced with such a legal reality, the Court 
nevertheless responded to contemporary social and political pressure and 
found that in Hiss' case "present and good moral character" itself" dem-
onstrates rehabilitation. "53 Certainly, such a view seems inconsistent 
with the Keenan and Centracchio decisions. The very concept of disbar-
ment suggests permanency in the eyes of the public. Yet after the Hiss 
decision it was no longer possible in Massachusetts to describe when such 
an extended disability would exist. Instead, disbarment appeared after the 
Hiss case to be a condition which invited tehabilitation. "Time and 
experience," the Court said, "may mend the flaws of character which 
allowed the immature to err, the chastening effect of disbarment may 
ultimately redirect the energy and reform the values of even the mature 
miscreant. There is always potentiality for reform. . . ." 54 
The message of the Hiss decision suggested that the mere passage of 
time was a testimonial to the potentiality for reform. It could be argued 
after Hiss that the Court had concluded that living an honest and decent 
life for a sufficient period of time following disbarment would, in itself, 
provide the foundation for reinstatement. The door appeared to be open 
to those attorneys who were disbarred for the most serious crimes to be 
reinstated following a sufficient passage of time, regatdless of the public 
perception of the prior immoral conduct. The variable, therefore, ap-
peared to be time, and as such the passage oftime served as the guidepost 
for the case immediately following Hiss, the petition of Richard K. Gor-
don. 
Perhaps in response to these inferences that could be drawn from the 
Hiss decision, the Court took the opportunity in its Survey year decision 
in the Matter of Richard K. Gordon ("Gordon 11")55 to retreat from any 
overly liberal view of reinstatement. From all outward appearances, the 
case would seem to have been easily decided in favor of reinstatement 
based upon the precedent of the landmark Hiss decision. The circum-
stances surrounding the Gordon petition were not significantly dissimilar 
from those surrounding the petition of Alger Hiss. Richard K. Gordon 
was convicted on April 16, 1963 of larceny, a felony, and conspiracy to 
commit larceny, a misdemeanor, in connection with the so-called "Bos-
ton Common Garage" cases56 which the Court referred to as a "notori-
53 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 461 n.22, 333 N.E.2d at 438 n.22. 
S4 [d. at 454, 333 N.E.2d at 434. 
ss 385 Mass. 48, 429 N.E.2d 1150 (1982). 
S6 See Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 201 N.E.2d 504 (1964). 
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ous saga of corruption and theft."57 In particular, Gordon was found to 
have been involved in a plan devised by the Chairman of the Massachu-
setts Parking Authority to obtain $310,000 in return for the contract to 
build the garage. As part of this conspiracy, Gordon received three checks 
totalling $100,000 as payment for legal services he never performed. 
Gordon subsequently gave $85,000 to one of his co-conspirators. In addi-
tion, as treasurer of the Granite State Realty and Construction Company, 
Gordon accepted a $40,000 check for erecting four construction buildings 
and a $25,000 check for setting up fences under a fictitious sub-contract. 
Subsequently, Gordon and the co-conspirator personally withdrew the 
funds deposited to the account of the corporation. 58 
Gordon served a total of twenty months of the sentences imposed in 
connection with his crimes. Prior to these events, he had practiced law in 
Massachusetts since 1948, and in 1956 he had been appointed Special 
Justice of the Third District Court at Ipswich. He was serving as ajudge of 
that court at the time the incidents leading to his conviction occurred. 59 
Gordon was disbarred by the Supreme Judicial Court following his con-
viction and sentencing on March 26, 1965.60 
By all accounts, following the events which led to his conviction, and in 
the years following his release from prison, Gordon lived a decent life. He 
was for a time comptroller of a small electronics corporation and, later, 
self-employed as a tax consultant. He had not been disbarred from prac-
tice before the United States Tax Court. 61 
The petition brought by Gordon before the full bench was, in fact, his 
second application for re-admission. The first petition ("Gordon I") was 
filed on September 13, 1976, and, following hearings before the Board, 
decided by a Single Justice on July 19, 1978.62 At the time of the first 
petition, Bar Counsel had stipulated that Gordon was of present good 
moral character. Both the Board of Bar Overseers and Justice Kaplan 
agreed with this view, but found it to be only one aspect of the consider-
ation to be given to a petition for reinstatement. In spite of Gordon's 
present good moral character, both the Board and Judge Kaplan were 
constrained to note that the public memory of the events surrounding 
Gordon's conviction and disbarment, as well as his position as ajudge of a 
court of the Commonwealth at the time of the criminal acts and at the time 
of the events resulting in his conviction and disbarment, militated against 
certifying him as fit for reinstatement. 63 Such a view was consistent, it 
57 385 Mass. at 56, 429 N.E.2d at 1156. 
58 /d. at 56-57, 429 N .E.2d at 1156. 
59 Id. at 50-51, 429 N .E.2d 1153. 
60 /d. at 48, 429 N .E.2d 1152. 
61 Id. at 51, 429 N.E.2d 1153. 
62 See id. at 49, 429 N .E.2d at 1152. 
63 Id. 
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appeared, with decisions prior to Hiss which held that the acts leading to 
disbarment and the state of facts existing at the time of such conduct must 
weigh heavily against a petitioner even in the face of a showing of present 
good moral character.64 Nevertheless, as part of his decision, Justice 
Kaplan specifically noted that his findings were without prejudice to the 
filing of the second petition for readmission at a later date. 65 
In reviewing Gordon's second application for reinstatement, the Su-
preme Judicial Court noted the disposition of the earlier petition, but 
conceded that there were a number of differences in the second instance. 
Of primary importance was the fact that the Board, which had opposed 
the first petition, was now supporting Gordon's reinstatement.66 With no 
opposition from those who had argued against the first application, includ-
ing the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Bar 
Association and the Essex County Bar Association, the Board reversed 
the position it had taken in Gordon I and decided that Gordon's present 
professional and moral fitness should prevail over the public memory of 
his past conduct. Further, the Board saw no meaningful distinction be-
tween the period of the Hiss disbarment, 23 years, and that suffered by 
Gordon, 16 years. 67 
In contrast to Gordon I, only the Bar Counsel opposed the application 
for readmission in Gordon 11.68 As a matter of procedural precedent, such 
an assertion of independence by the Bar Counsel from ties to the Board, 
and the ability to speak in a separate and opposing voice to that of the 
Board, was an important consideration for the Office of Bar Counsel. The 
Rules of Court and the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers are less than 
clear concerning the independence of Bar Counsel with respect to such 
recommendations. To the extent that the Court accepted the right of Bar 
Counsel to stand alone, in opposition to the Board, on the issue of 
Gordon's reinstatement, Gordon II is of procedural significance because it 
confirms the growing independence of the Office of Bar Counsel. 
Having recognized sub silentio the ability of Bar Counsel to stand alone 
in opposition to the Board, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the 
present petition in light of the standards established by it in the Hiss 
decision. The Court acknowledged the issues raised by Bar Counsel, and 
outlined these considerations with respect to the reinstatement petition. 
In particular, these concerns included whether the attorney was mature in 
age and experience; whether his transgression was an isolated instance, or 
did he continually flout the law in a course of recurring conduct; whether 
64 See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text. 
6S 385 Mass. at 49, 429 N.E.2d at 1152. 
66 Id. at 56, 429 N .E.2d at 1156. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 54-56, 429 N.E.2d at 1154-55. 
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the offenses committed were relatively minor violations or of major sig-
nificance; whether his act was the result of sudden passion, or deliberate, 
requiring premeditation, a carefully formed plan, and the continuance of a 
corrupt purpose long enough to carry that plan into effect; and whether he 
was driven to the offenses by compelling financial necessity or, instead, 
they were the result of some internal weakness of character. 69 
By establishing specific concerns regarding the moral status of the 
petitioner at the time of the commission of his crime, the Court refined the 
method by which it would compare the past moral condition of a 
petitioner to his present moral fitness. As such, the further factors consid-
ered by the Court helped narrow the broad issues raised by the Court in 
Hiss and also applied in Gordon II: 
(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was disbarred, 
(2) the petitioner's character, maturity, and experience at the time of his 
disbarment, (3) the petitioner's occupations and conduct in the time since 
his disbarment, (4) the time elapsed since the disbarment and (5) the 
petitioner's present competence in legal skills.1° 
While the Court found that it could answer favorably issues with respect 
to Gordon's present competence and legal skills and present moral 
character, it had considerably more difficulty with questions relating to 
the potential impact of his reinstatement: 
The nub of the question is whether his resumption of practice will have an 
actual effect upon the integrity of the bar and thereby on the administration 
of justice and the public interest. In this inquiry we are concerned not only 
with the actuality of the petitioner's morality and competence, but also on 
the reaction to his reinstatement by the bar and public. 71 
Bar Counsel urged that the issue was not merely the present good moral 
character of Mr. Gordon, but rather the totality of his conduct including 
the effect of the evidence of his lack of moral character at the time that he 
committed the offenses for which he was convicted. 72 
The Court, however, refused to define the process by which past moral 
conduct would be balanced against present good moral character. In 
doing so, the Court avoided one of the most troublesome issues left open 
by the Hiss case, namely, the effect of the passage of time upon a specific 
disbarment case. Specifically, by refusing to determine how to weigh a 
lengthy period of good conduct against a past bad act, criminal oroth-
erwise, the Court left open the question of how long one should stay away 
69 [d. at 54, 429 N.E.2d at 1155. 
70 [d. at 52, 429 N.E.2d at 1154. 
7\ [d. See also People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1%9); Matter of Ben-
nethum, 278 A.2d 831,833 (Del. 1971); People ex reI. Chicago Bar Assn. v. Reed, 341 Ill. 
573, 173 N.E. 772 (1930); Application of Van Wyck, 225 Minn. 90, 20 N.W.2d 654 (1947). 
Some jurisdictions are so concerned about the effect of reinstatement that they attempt to 
make it virtually a permanent disability where a serious crime was involved. See supra note 
5. 
72 385 Mass. at 54, 429 N.E.2d at 1154-55. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/15
§ 12.2 ETHICS 401 
from practice beyond the minimum five year period set by the Court and 
Board rules. 73 
Instead, the Court found that it could refuse reinstatement on the basis 
of the effect that such reinstatement would have upon the administration 
of justice, the Bar, and the public interest. 74 The Court viewed the effect 
of reinstatement as an indicator to the public and the Bar that the original 
offense was of limited gravity. While the impact of reinstatement upon the 
public and the Bar was a relevant issue in the Hiss case, the Court seemed 
to avoid dealing with these issues in Gordon II, preferring instead to focus 
on measurements of the moral character of the individual. In the Hiss 
case, like the Gordon II Petition, there was no outside opposition to the 
reinstatement. And yet, while the Court in Hiss chose not to focus upon 
the generalized effect upon the public of reinstatement of a disbarred 
attorney convicted of perjury, the Gordon II Court made the nature of the 
crime and the circumstances surrounding it the touchstone upon which 
the public perception of the Bar and the administration of justice would 
be adversely affected. 
By focusing upon the present public perception of the original crime, 
the Court further enhanced the variables at its disposal for determining 
when an applicant is properly acceptable for reinstatement. While the 
concurring opinion of Justice Lynch75 and the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Nolan76 saw no real difference between the Gordon ana Hiss applica-
tions, the majority of the Court nevertheless expanded its standard, focus-
ing not only on the passage of time, not only on present moral character 
and not merely upon the seriousness of the prior crime, but also on the 
present impact upon the public of the nature of the offenses in the context 
of present day political consciousness: 
We agree that the effect of this decision upon Gordon and his future is 
important, but the effect upon the interests of the public and its confidence 
in the bar is of overriding importance. Further, the ultimate duty of decision 
rests with this Court. In recent years there has been wide-spread and 
frequent pUblicity about corruption related to public contracts. We think 
that public perception of a reinstatement of Gordon at this time would in 
high probability reflect badly upon the reputation of the bar for integrity, 
73 Consider the following remarks attributed to a former bar association president: 
I for one don't any longer know what rehabilitation means in this context. Theologi-
cally, rehabilitation implied an acknowledgement of the commission of sin, a contrite 
heart, a true spirit of repentance. As nearly as I can figure out by our procedures, 
rehabilitation means that for some period of time following disbarment, the man has 
not been in trouble. 
Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, supra note 40, at 153. 
74 385 Mass. at 55, 429 N .E.2d at 1155. 
75 [d. at 58-59, 429 N.E.2d at 1157 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
76 ld. at 59, 429 N.E.2d at 1157 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
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particularly because Gordon was a judge who was involved in notorious 
crimes concerning public contracts. 77 
While the public perception of the Bar, whether that perception be 
favorable or adverse, was clearly important in considering the Hiss Peti-
tion, the Court chose to deal only obliquely with the issue in that case. 
Why the Court chose to focus on this issue in the Gordon case can only be 
left to speculation. What is clear is that along with the passage of time, 
and along with present good moral character, an applicant must consider 
the social and political impact that his readmission will have upon the 
public perception of the legal profession. Although the Court left itself 
room to distinguish future cases by noting that Gordon was both a judge 
and a lawyer at the time of his disbarment, there is no suggestion in the 
decision that one who was only a lawyer would not face the same scrutiny 
with respect to public perception of the effect of his reinstatement. 78 
In the final analysis, whether the Gordon II decision is the result of a 
particular moment in our history when the honesty of public officials and 
white collar crime is a paramount concern, or whether the actual stan-
dards employed by the Court will reveal themselves in future cases, is 
again a matter that can only be left to speCUlation. What is clear, however, 
is that the Court was not completely satisfied with the suggestion that the 
Hiss case left the door completely open in Massachusetts to reinstatement 
of disbarred attorneys who, through the mere passage of time, had estab-
lished their present good moral character. Past acts and the current public 
reaction to those past acts WOUld, the Court stated in Gordon II, weigh 
heavily in any consideration of the readmission of a disbarred attorney. 
§ 12.3. Conflict of Interest. The restrictions imposed by Canon 5 of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility and particularly Disciplinary Rule 
5-1051 weigh heavily upon attorneys whose practice results in the de vel-
77 Id. at 58, 429 N.E.2d at 1157. Although the Court refers to Gordon's status as ajudge as 
well as a lawyer, this does not appear to be the touchstone upon which the denial of the 
petition rests. But see Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15,71, 3.06 N.E.2d 203, 234-35 (1973); 
Matter of De Saulnier (No.4) 360 Mass. 787, 811, 279 N.E.2d 296, 309 (1972). 
78 See supra note 76. 
§ 12.3. 1 Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
appears in Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07 (effective January 1, 1981), provides as follows: 
DR 5-105. Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another 
Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer. 
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected 
by the acceptance of the proferred employment, or if it would be likely to involve him 
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will or is likely to be adversely 
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opment of particular specialties or specific expertise in litigation matters. 
The chances of being either simultaneously or subsequently on both sides 
of a case or of challenging a former client are substantial and affect the 
choice of counsel by clients, the time expended in litigation, and the 
economics of legal representation. It is a common tactic, particularly 
where counsel is providing effective representation, for an opponent to 
attempt to remove that counsel by a motion to disqualify where differing 
interests or a conflict of interest may exist in a particular legal matter. 
The result is a miring of the court processes in the name of preserving 
the independent judgment of a lawyer and the confidences and secrets 
of a client. 
Because the issues posed by mUltiple representation often arise in the 
context of complex legal matters where the economics of representation 
and the particular expertise of a lawyer or law firm are of primary con-
cern, cases involving conflict of interest and Canon 5 are not uncommon. 2 
During the Survey year in McCourt Co., Inc. v. FPC Properties, Inc. 3 the 
Supreme Judicial Court grappled with the combined issues of conflict of 
interest, consent and confidential client relationships. The Court's deci-
sion in McCourt is indicative of the complexity and significance of the 
conflict problem for the legal profession. 
The Court referred to the conflict of interest problem in McCourt as one 
of simultaneous representation. 4 Simultaneous representation is a sub-
category of mUltiple representation of differing or conflicting interests that 
is defined in court decisions rather than in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.s Simultaneous representation has been distinguished from 
successive representation where an attorney represents an opponent of a 
former client. In the former instance issues of independent judgment are 
said to be paramount; in the latter the conflict is said to be in the possible 
affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him 
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent 
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each 
and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of 
such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on 
behalf of each. 
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment 
under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with 
him jlr his firm may accept or continue such employment. 
2 See Commonwealth v. Geraway, 364 Mass. 168, 301 N.E.2d 814 (1973); Parsons v. 
Continental National American Group, 535 P.2d 17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Kamp, 40 
N.J. 588, 194 A.2d 236 (1963); Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 390 Pa. 231, 
135 A.2d 252 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958). 
3 386 Mass. 145, 434 N.E.2d 1234 (1982). 
4 [d. at 147, 434 N.E.2d at 1236. 
5 See cases cited supra note 2. 
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use of client confidences.6 Such a distinction is unfortunately overly 
simplistic. The question of the use of information obtained from a client in 
a present or past representation is just as significant in both types of 
conflict situations. What is essential in each instance is that the attorney 
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that he can adequately represent 
the interest of each client and that such representation will not adversely 
affect the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of 
each.1 Further, and of separate significance, is that even if the lawyer 
determines that he can exercise his independent professional judgment on 
behalf of each client, there must be consent to the joint representation by 
each client after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representa-
tion upon the exercise of the necessary independent professional judg-
ment.8 
The combined problems of differing interests in simultaneous represen-
tation and consent to simultaneous representation are at the heart of the 
Court's concern in the McCourt case. The action was one to disqualify the 
law firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley and White from representation of the 
McCourt Company in an action seeking specific performance of an option· 
agreement and damages against FPC Properties with respect to certain 
property in the Fort Point Channel area of Boston.9 FPC Properties was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Cabot, Cabot and Forbes Co., which was 
named as a defendant, along with FPC, as guarantor of certain obligations 
of FPC Properties. Apparently, Parker, Coulter represented and con-
tinues to represent Cabot, Cabot and Forbes in the defense of personal 
injury actions.lo As a result, counsel for the defendant FPC brought an 
action to disqualify Parker, Coulter on the basis of simultaneous represen-
tation of differing interests .11 Parker, Coulter argued that disqualification 
of counsel was not required in every instance of simultaneous representa-
tion, noting that the important determining factor was whether confi-
dences or secrets that could be used against Cabot, Cabot and Forbes had 
been entrusted to counsel representing the allegedly conflicting interest. 
Further, Parker, Coulter argued that the dual representation would not 
affect or have any adverse impact upon its adversary posture towards 
Cabot, Cabot and Forbes in this action. 12 
The hallmark case which establishes the point of departure for deter-
6 See A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (1976). 
7 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5~ !05(A) and (B). See supra 
note 1. 
• See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-!05(C). See suprfl note I. 
9 386 Mass. at 147, 434 N.E.2d at 1236. 
10 [d. 
\I [d. 
12 [d. 
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mining when differing interests are improperly represented either in si-
multaneous or successive matters is T.C. & Theatre Corp. v. Warner 
Brothers Pictures. 13 In that case, a federal district court in New York 
determined that the lawyer or law firm charged with dual representation 
should have the virtually impossible burden of demonstrating that no 
confidences or secrets had been obtained in the course of prior represen-
tation which could be used to the advantage of one party against the other 
in the present action. 14 Essentially, T.e. & Theatre Corp. required that 
the lawyer accused of the conflict prove the negative. Once the complain-
ing client has alleged a substantial relationship between the prior rep-
resentation and the present representation, the burden of proof shifts to 
the attorney who is required to demonstrate that he has not obtained such 
secrets or confidences so as to offend Canons 4 or 5 of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
T.C. & Theatre Corp. suggests a standard for rather obvious problems 
of representation with respect to differing interests. There can be little 
argument that where there is the potential for an attorney utilizing facts 
which he would not have obtained but for a prior representation of a 
client, the present Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (A) and (B) would require 
withdrawal on the basis of the possibility of an "adverse effect" upon the 
present representation,15 The issue presented in the McCourt case, how-
ever, is an even more subtle refinement of the "substantial relationship" 
test established in T.e. & Theatre Corp. and combines problems of both 
prior and simultaneous representation. 
In McCourt, the Court assumed that the plaintiff, McCourt, had con-
sented to Parker, Coulter's representation of it in both an action against 
another client of Parker, Coulter, FPC Properties and Cabot, Cabot and 
Forbes, and to Parker, Coulter's prior and continuing representation of 
Cabot, Cabot and Forbes in personal injury actions involving third parties 
unrelated to the present law suit. There was no indication, however, of 
consent by Cabot, Cabot and Forbes or FPC Properties to the representa-
tion of McCourt by Parker, Coulter. It was this question of whether there 
was knowing and willing consent by Cabot, Cabot and Forbes to the 
representation of McCourt by Parker, Coulter which raised the most 
important issue in the McCourt case, namely, whether Parker, Coulter 
could continue to exercise independent judgment while having both a 
present and prior relationship with the defendant. 16 
The Court accepted the McCourt case as an interlocutory appeal from 
13 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
14 [d. at 268-69. 
15 See supra note 1 and text accompanying note 7. 
16 See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Ltd., 
528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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the superior court. 17 In examining the trial judge's decision to allow the 
continued representation of McCourt by Parker, Coulter, the Court found 
that the standards and burden of proof applied by the superior court were 
not appropriate. IS Essentially, in overturning the lower court decision the 
Supreme Judicial Court adopted the views of the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits as set forth in Cinema 5 Ltd. v. 
Cinerama Ltd. 19 and International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin. 20 
Both of those decisions present a strong argument for disqualification of 
counsel even though the moving party fails to demonstrate a specific 
breach of a confidence occurring in the simultaneous representation or a 
specific issue upon which the independent judgment of the attorney could 
be put in question.21 
Under Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (A) and (B) as it appeared at the time of 
the decisions in IBM and Cinema 5, an attorney was proscribed from 
representation if' 'the exercise of its independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his 
representation of another client."22 At the present time, both parts (A) 
and (B) of the rule have been amended to also restrict multiple employ-
ment "if it would be likely to involve [the lawyer] in representing differing 
interests. "23 Differing interests are defined by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility as including "every interest that will adversely affect 
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a 
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest. "24 Essentially, 
McCourt identified the concept of "differing interests" with that of "ad-
verse effect" by adopting the Cinema 5 and IBM definitions as roughly the 
equivalent of differing interests.2s Both Cinema 5 and IBM found that the 
17 386 Mass. at 148, 434 N.E.2d at 1236. The propriety of an interlocutory appeal of a 
denial of a motion for disqualification of counsel is an issue that has yet to be decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. The federal courts have generally refused appellate review of an 
order denying disqualification of counsel until after final judgment on the merits of the 
underlying case. See id. at 148 n.2, 434 N.E.2d at 1236 n.2 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (198\)). Although the Court's action in McCourt would 
appear to sanction such an interlocutory appeal, the Court stated that the question remained 
open because the matter before it came to the full bench ofthe Court from a single justice of 
the Appeals Court. The Court's rationale for allowing the interlocutory appeal in McCourt is 
based on a slender distinction, however, and places the Court in a position where it will no 
doubt have to decide the propriety of interlocutory appeals of motions for disqualification in 
the forseeable future. 
18 [d. at 148, 434 N .E.2d at 1236. 
19 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). 
20 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978). 
21 See 528 F.2d at 1386; 579 F.2d at 279-280. 
22 See 386 Mass. at 149 n.3, 434 N.E.2d at 1237 n.3. 
23 See supra note I. 
24 See SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07 (Definitions). 
2S See 386 Mass. at 149 n.3, 434 N.E.2d at 1237 n.3. 
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propriety of an attorney's mUltiple representation must be determined not 
so much by the substantial relationship of issues in the litigation as by 
determining whether the lawyer is exercising the undivided loyalty which 
an attorney owes to each of his clients. 26 Therefore, the issue is not 
merely the temptation to utilize confidences or secrets of a client to the 
client's disadvantage as set forth in the T.C. Theatre case, but rather the 
basic fiduciary obligation that "no man can serve two masters" regardless 
of whether there is a substantial relationship between the representation 
that the lawyer has undertaken on behalf of the client and the representa-
tion that puts the lawyer in opposition to that client. As the court in 
Cinema 5 put it: 
[T]he "substantial relationship" test does not set a sufficiently high stan-
dard by which the necessity for disqualification should be determined. That 
test may properly be applied only where the representation of the former 
client has been terminated and the parameters of such relationship have 
been fixed. Where the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representa-
tion is prima facie improper, and the attorney must be prepared to show, at 
the very least, that there will be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or 
diminution in the vigor of his representation.27 
It is clear that the Supreme Judicial Court has chosen to impose a heavy 
burden upon a lawyer or law firm in Massachusetts which undertakes 
multiple representation, even though the litigation is unrelated to other 
work undertaken by the lawyer for one of the litigants. The Court's view 
is consistent with that of the Third Circuit in recognizing that: 
[I]t is likely that some "adverse effect" on an attorney's exercise of his 
independent judgment on behalf of a client may result from the attorney's 
adverse posture towards that client in another legal matter. For example, a 
possible effect on the quality of the attorney's services on behalf of the 
client being sued may be a diminution in the vigor of his representation of 
the client in the other matter. A serious effect on the attorney-client rela-
tionship may follow if the client discovers from a source other than the 
attorney that he is being sued in a different matter by the attorney. 28 
Having adopted the strong prophylactic rule of IBM and Cinema 5, it 
would appear that the only basis upon which an attorney or law firm could 
satisfy the burden of demonstrating the reconciliation of differing interests 
in Massachusetts would be to establish knowing consent on the part of the 
client subject to the adverse representation. 29 Unfortunately, this leaves 
open the question of whether a client, unschooled in the technical aspects 
of the law, can ever give such valid consent to simultaneous representa-
tion. The Court, however, failed to analyze this difficult problem in the 
26 528 F.2d at 1386; 579 F.2d at 280. 
27 528 F.2d at 1387 (citation omitted). 
28 579 F.2d at 280; see 386 Mass. at 149, 434 N.E.2d at 1236-37. 
29 See 386 Mass. at 146, 434 N.E.2d at 1237. 
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McCourt decision, and assumed that such consent is both possible and 
necessary. 
Rather than examine the consent issue, the Court focused upon the 
argument of Parker, Coulter that an exception to multiple representation 
should be fashioned where a commercial corporation rather than a natural 
person is involved as a client.30 Large corporations, it was argued, may 
distribute legal business to many law firms and lawyers with a view to 
barring any such firms and attorneys from handling cases against the 
corporation.31 Arguably, Parker, Coulter suggested, if Cabot, Cabot and 
Forbes spreads its business around to enough lawyers and law firms, it will 
become impossible for opponents of Cabot, Cabot and Forbes to gain 
adequate representation because each opponent is more likely than not to 
hire a lawyer with some prior or current relationship to Cabot, Cabot and 
Forbes. As persuasive as this argument might be, the Court found no 
basis on the facts before it32 for creating a distinction between corpora-
tions and natural persons within either the differing interest definition of 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 in the Code itself, the proposed new ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct,33 or in the case law and opinions relevant 
to the subject. 34 
30 386 Mass. at 149, 434 N.E.2d at 1238. 
31 !d. at 149-150, 434 N.E.2d at 1238. 
32 [d. at 151, 434 N.E.2d at 1238. 
33 The ABA Proposed Model Rules, in pertinent part, state: 
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest; General Rule 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's ability to consider, 
recommend or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be 
adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests. 
(b) When a lawyer's own interests or other responsibilities might adversely 
affect the representation of a client, the lawyer shall not represent the client 
unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the other responsibilities or inter-
ests involved will not adversely affect the best interest of the client; and 
(2) The client consents after disclosure. When representation of mul-
tiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the disclosure shall include 
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved. 
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer 
represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. 
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate 
against a client. For example, a lawyer engaged in a suit against an enterprise 
in an unrelated matter if doing so will not affect the lawyer's conduct of the suit 
and if both clients consent upon disclosure. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, at 49 (Proposed Draft 1981). 
34 See, e.g., IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. 
Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. 
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By disqualifying Parker, Coulter, the Court clearly stated that a client's 
interest in a counsel of its choice cannot predominate in all instances. The 
right to retain a particular lawyer is not absolute where that choice would 
raise a question of the loyalty of the attorney. In such circumstances, the 
McCourt decision suggests that the maintenance of the integrity of the 
legal profession and its high standing in the community are as important as 
the obligation to provide effective counsel, particularly where conflict of 
interest is a concern. Apparently, the Court has chosen to favor the public 
perception of impartiality over the impediments that disqualification of 
counsel imposes upon the client in the efficient disposition of matters 
before the courts of the Commonwealth and has reiterated the philosophy 
of Justice Storey who once observed: 
When the client employs an attorney, he has the right to presume, if the 
latter be silent on the point, that he has no engagements which interfere in 
any degree with his exclusive devotion to the cause confided in him; that he 
has no interest, which may betray his judgment, or endanger his fidelity. 35 
The Supreme Judicial Court apparently has made a difficult choice in 
the McCourt case in favor of disqualification and against multiple rep-
resentation. The decision places in the hands of corporate clients and 
other entities who customarily use legal talent extensively, the tactical 
ability to raise a motion for disqualification against those attorneys who 
they have used in the past, or are using at present, even though the matter 
in which they are opposed is unrelated to the current multiple representa-
tion. Such a result is particularly disturbing in areas of practice where the 
number of attorneys who have gained unique expertise is limited, such as 
in patent, bankruptcy and anti-trust law. In those instances, client choices 
will be limited not only by the scarcity of experts, but by the fact of the 
expert attorney's prior and current representation. 
Finally, the Court left undetermined an important issue relating to 
expense and proper disposition of the work product of a disqualified 
attorney. Hopefully, the Court will determine that the work product of a 
disqualified attorney is available to new counsel where there has been no 
showing that substantial harm will result as to matters at issue in the 
current litigation. As long as there is no showing by the moving party that 
injury would result from the transfer of the work product, it would appear 
appropriate to allow the client to obtain the work product as a means to 
expedite the litigation and avoid costly inconvenience to the client who 
has suffered the disqualification of counsel. 36 The Court, hopefully, sug-
Rottner, _ Conn. _,203 A.2d 82 (1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re 
Cohn, _ N.J. _, 216 A.2d 1 (1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978). These cases are 
cited in the ABA Proposed Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.7, at 54 (Proposed Draft 1981). 
35 Williams v. Reed, 3 F: Cas. 405, 415 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733). 
36 See IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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gested as much when it noted that Parker, Coulter was not involved in any 
unethical conduct in the McCourt case, but merely in an honest disagree-
ment concerning the appropriate application of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility to continuing representation. 37 
§ 12.4. Trial Conduct - Prosecutorial Misconduct. Although the facts in 
the Survey year decision of Commonwealth v. Hoppin' present a rather 
straightforward example of professional misconduct by a prosecutor dur-
ing final argument, the decision provides an interesting examination of the 
standards of conduct applicable to both the prosecution and defense in 
criminal matters before the trial courts of the Commonwealth. The issues 
considered by the Court include not only permissible standards for final 
argument, but also the manner in which materials, not previously intro-
duced into evidence but discussed during the trial, may find their way into 
closing arguments by way of props or direct reference. In addition, the 
case questions the limits to which counsel may go in embellishing and 
elaborating upon emotional issues at the close of the case. 
In Hoppin, a criminal defendant was charged with rape, assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and receipt of 
stolen goods. 2 Apparently, the defendant used a length of leather to bind 
the hands of his victim during the rape. The defendant had known the 
victim as a friend prior to the incident and had heard from the victim that 
her boyfriend was both abusing and defrauding her. On the day of the 
alleged criminal acts, the defendant told the victim that he had killed her 
former boyfriend and two companions and that he would "have" her in 
payment for his services.3 The police investigation following the com-
plaint by the victim produced a knife, a stolen gun, ammunition and 
marijuana, but no length of leather.4 Although the prosecutor referred to 
the means by which the victim was bound, no demonstrative prop was 
used during the trial, nor did the judge receive any notice at the bench 
conference prior to final argument that the prosecutor was going to use a 
leather thong to graphically describe the event. 5 Nevertheless, the pros-
ecutor wrapped a half inch length of leather around his fist and kept it 
there for thirteen minutes during his closing argument. The judge, how-
ever, was not in a position to see the leather, and because of this, he 
overruled an objection of the defense to the prosecutor's manner of final 
argument. 6 
37 386 Mass. at 151, 434 N.E.2d at 1238. 
§ 12.4. I 387 Mass. 25, 438 N.E.2d 820 (1982). 
2 ld. at 25, 438 N.E.2d at 821-22. 
3 ld. at 26-27, 438 N .E.2d at 822. 
4 /d. at 28, 438 N.E.2d at 822. 
5 /d. 
6 ld. at 29, 438 N.E.2d at 823. 
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The defendant was convicted of the charges against him. He then 
appealed, asserting that the prosecutor committed reversible error when 
he bound his hand with the length of rawhide, not in evidence, as a 
dramatic prop during closing argument to the jury. 7 The Supreme Judicial 
Court agreed and reversed the convictions, finding the prosecutor's con-
duct to be "clearly improper. "8 
The response of the Court to the action of the prosecutor was direct and 
absolute. "The prosecutor's display of rawhide," Chief Justice Hennes-
sey stated, "was clearly improper. Closing argument must be confined to 
the evidence and the fair inferences from the evidence."9 Absolutism 
aside, however, the problem for trial counsel is to determine what "dis-
plays" are truly improper because they are not evidentiary or properly 
inferred from evidence or testimony. In other words, at what point do the 
"props" used by counsel cease to be instructive to the jury or the court, 
and instead threaten the reasoned process by which the finder of fact must 
come to a decision. 
In Hoppin, the trial judge, following an objection of defense counsel, 
attempted to remedy the effect of the use of the leather prop by curative 
instructions. Specifically, the judge told the jury to disregard what the 
prosecutor had in his hand because it was not a "matter" which was in 
evidence and therefore was beyond the limits of what counsel could 
present to the jury.10 It is questionable to what degree such curative 
instructions are ever effective upon the minds of jurors, particularly when 
an attorney has used a method of persuasion more dramatic, and more 
impressive than the means used to counter the effort. On the other hand, 
our system of advocacy embraces the notion that many forms of visual 
and oratorical persuasion are either appropriate to the courtroom or, ifnot 
entirely appropriate, difficult to regulate within the context of the tradi-
tional adversary system. 
In this regard the Code of Professional Responsibility is not a particu-
larly helpful guide. Lawyers before a tribunal are cautioned not to state 
or allude to a matter that will not be supported by admissible evidence. 11 
7 Id. at 25-26, 438 N .E.2d at 822. 
8 !d. at 30, 438 N .E.2d at 823. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 29 n.5, 438 N.E.2d at 823 n.5. Specifically, the judge cautioned the jury that: 
!d. 
Briefly, it was brought to my attention that the prosecution in this case, during the 
course of a portion of his argument, had with him in his hands a rope of some kind, 
visibly, apparently made out of leather. Now, that was not in evidence, and I instruct 
you to disregard the fact that he had it in his hand. It would not be proper for you not 
to do so .... [Hje may not bring before you matters which are not in evidence, and 
that was inappropriate and it ... should be disregarded by you, ... because you must 
decide the case based solely on the evidence that you have heard. 
11 SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07 DR 7-106(C)(1). 
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Similarly, both the Standards for the Prosecution and the Defense Func-
tions provide that it is improper for either side to introduce, at any time 
during the trial, facts not properly admitted which might cause the jury to 
be misled as to the inferences or conclusions which it might draw. 12 
Unfortunately, the questions concerning the introduction of dramatic 
props at a trial are difficult to cover completely in a flat prohibition against 
the introduction of "facts" or "evidence" notproper[y admitted. First of 
all, it is unclear what the Code includes within the ambit of facts and 
evidence. On the one hand, the notion simply could encompass those 
technical distinctions between admitted or excluded facts and testimony; 
on the other hand, there could be a broader concern with the use of 
subterfuge generally as a part of the accepted trial tactics. 
Subterfuge in the context of trial tactics runs the gamut from surprise 
and trickery to props of one form or a~other and to communications to the 
trier of fact by other than proper means. 13 For example, our adversary 
system both invites and condemns the use of forms of dress as a means of 
communication to the jury. Yet, it seems clear that every trial lawyer has 
suggested to a client how to dress to his or her advantage in the court-
room. Similarly, we are reluctant to approve the use of props or dramatic 
tactics to obtain an advantage over a particular witness or before the trier 
of fact. Nevertheless, the profession is more than familiar with tactics 
such as trying to provoke or coerce witness testimony through the use of 
spurious documents or props. In response to the ambiguous signals which 
our trial system gives to its advocates, as Judge Keeton has stated: 
The duty of supporting the client's cause is sometimes so forcefully stated 
as to support the argument that as a trial lawyer you are obliged to assert 
every legal claim or qefense available, except those you reject on tactical 
grounds relating to the immediate case. But the aim of the trial system to 
achieve justice, ~he interests of future clients, and your legitimate interest in 
your own reputation and future effectiveness at the bar compel moderation 
of that extreme view. 14 
The trial lawyer is thus left to find the line beyond which trial tactics, 
and in the Hoppin instance, final argument, may not go in terms of 
introducing evidehce extraneous to the proceedings. Certainly, the jury in 
Hoppin had heard Qf the leather thong from th,e victim. The jury would 
have had such an image in its collective mind even if it had not actually 
been I1roduced. No amouht of cross-examination on the part of the de-
fe~se could remove such aJ:) image if the jurors chose to recall it. Never-
12 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-5.6, 3-5.9 (ABA 1980); 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-5.6, 4-5.9 (ABA 1980); see also 
SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08 PF 13 a.nd 14, DF 14 and 15. 
\3 See R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHOD,S 4-5, 104-05, 326-27 (1973); Rubin, 
A Causerilf on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 578-93 (1975). 
14 R. KEETON, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
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theless, the Court found it necessary to restrict the allusion to the leather 
in the final argument. . . 
The Court viewed the prosecutor's prop in Hoppin as one which incites 
the emotions of the jury. 15 The im~ge, according to the Court, is one of 
sexual violence totally uncorroborated except for the testimony of the 
victim. 16 But as noted previously, the unsubstantiated use of the leather 
strap to bind the victim would be available to the prosecutor as an image 
in final argument in any event because of the victim's prior testimony. The 
Court is therefore not restricting the discussion ofthe image but rather the 
physical manifestation of the appropriate image. Unfortunately, the re-
striction is more easily applied than explained. In the same case, buried in 
a footnote, is a reference to the fact that the same prosecutor, at another 
point in final argument, "displayed a small pillow, which he explained to 
the jury, was used by his daughter to hide teeth for the tooth fairy. The 
prosecutor used the pillow to dramatize his analogy of the defendant's 
theory of the case to a fairy tale." 17 N 0 referenc~ was made by the Court 
to this act of the prosecutor as one which would also stir up the emotion of 
the jury. Yet such a dramatic act certainly contained a prop which, 
altho.ugh not oriented toward sex and violence, nevertheless was designed 
to have a graphic impact upon the jurors. 
Rather than speculate concerning the reason for the Court treating one 
prop as violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and another 
acceptable adversary procedure during final argument, it is perhaps best 
to conclude that the problem is inherently subjective. Our system enco.ur-
ages drama, innovation and to a certain extent, props in the process of 
advocacy. To conclude one prop prejudicial and another appropriate 
suggests that the Supreme Judicial Court should compile a catalogue of 
appropriate dramatic procedures for trial advocacy. In most instances, 
the trial judge would appear to be in the best position to draw conclusions 
concerning such propriety. Otherwise the spector of rigid form of practice 
and procedure looms all too real for the trial bar. 
IS 387 Mass. at 30, 438 N.E.2d at 824. 
16 [d. at 31, 438 N.E.2d at 824. 
17 [d. at 29 n.3, 438 N .E.2d at 822-23 n.3. 
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